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PANEL DISCUSSION: MEXICO AND U.S. WHITE COLLAR CRIME
PREVENTION AT THE MILLENNIUM
BRUCE ZAGARIS, ESQ., MODERATOR'
LIC. CARLOS LOPERENA RUIZ, LUCINDA LOW, ESQ.,
PROFESSOR LEO ROMERO
LIC. RODRIGO LABARDINI, AND LIC. ALEJANDRO POSADAS,
PANELISTS"
Lic. Carlos Loperena Ruiz: I had to review some of my basic principles of
criminal law, and the Criminal Code of Mexico to look up what the definition of
"white-collar crime." I found that they usually compare blue-collar crimes with
white-collar crimes, and that blue-collar is supposed to be a violent crime while
white-collar is an economic criminal offense. The main white-collar crimes we see
are fraud, tax evasion, even money laundering, and some other crimes specifically
established in the Mexican statutes. Also, they all call the attention of public
opinion. White-collar crimes or finance criminal offences committed by Mexican
bankers or former bankers or stock brokers who flee the country, are pursued by
Interpol, and eventually are extradited back from foreign countries are not usually
tried before a court, but by the newspapers. They are condemned and they are given
a life sentence even before coming to trial.
I think that these white-collar crimes are usually punished by public opinion, even
if the authorities do not punish them. The individuals are never called "allegedly
responsible" by the press. They are always portrayed as criminals who are
devastated by the media before they come back to Mexico after a highly publicized
extradition process. When they come to Mexico, people see them walking on the
streets, going to the most expensive restaurants and going here and there. Therefore,
the public opinion in Mexico is really angry with them because they think they are
criminals. The Mexican population thinks they are real criminals, and that they are
guilty of everything they are accused of, yet does not see them in jail. We need
some mechanism to provide a fair way to judge and try them, and also to avoid
having these public trials in the media and this devastating public propaganda
against the accused. I think that the criminal cases in the media should be limited
in some way. We have to prepare and train the journalists not to talk about criminal
law as if they were lawyers and judges. This is a problem in Mexico. In the 1980s,
Mexicans learned economics through the media because we suffered devaluations,
controls, and many other economic problems.
Today, Mexicans speak as if they were criminal lawyers. They know about arrest
orders, indictments, and many other things, because all the media is talking about
white-collar crimes. Today we have a famous case of a former CEO of Petroleos
Mexicanos, PEMEX, who is facing extradition. He came to the United States
District Court and wanted to be extradited to Mexico. But, the US court had no
petition of extradition. Why? Probably because the Mexican authorities are
preparing more accusations and they do not want to extradite him on just one charge
but on multiple charges.
* Moderator biography is included at end of panel discussion
** Panelists biographies are included at the end of the panel discussion
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Bruce Zagaris: And I guess an interesting element of the media issue is that now
the international media is involved, so that even if you were to control or to educate
the Mexican media, it would be difficult to reign in the Houston Chronicle, the New
York Times or the Miami Herald, because now the international media in these cases
are often very aggressive.
Loperena Ruiz: Yes, the media is very difficult to control. It is a matter of human
rights. The media damages a person because after the person is accused and judged
by the media, he or she comes to the court of law and is acquitted. That person's
spouse and children are damaged for their entire lives, yet he or she was acquitted
by the court of law. Should we promote some campaign to avoid this destructive
way to publish news and so forth? I am not in favor of the criminals, of course. I
am in favor of somebody being considered a criminal only after a judgment
establishes the legal situation.
Zagaris: Of course, one element of contending with this problem is that some
defendants have their own media campaign. I remember in the 1980s, I did a lot of
work for Mark Rich. It was for his public relations branch that needed convince not
only the US media but also the Swiss government that he should be able to obtain
his permanent residency in order to withstand the efforts by the United States to
prosecute him.
One other element that is very interesting with respect to the investigation and
prosecution of white-collar crimes and that is there are a number of civil
prosecutions. For instance, a few weeks ago, in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, a case was filed against, among other things, a
Swiss law firm and the head of state for the Republic of Azerbijan and some other
officials, regarding corruption and money laundering. It was brought under the
Alien Tort Claims Act' and a number of other statutes. In other central Asian cases
of alleged corruption there is RICO, civil RICO.2 What happens is that the
governments hire US firms when they see that there is money in the US, and they
bring these massive RICO actions and they alone can be very difficult in terms of
the defendant. Some of these defendants find themselves facing charges in four or
five counties simultaneous with the RICO actions. It can be difficult for defendants
to face multiple charges in all these countries.
Lic. Alejandro Posadas: I would like to suggest another way to deal with the
difficult issues raised about public prosecution. There should be damages available
in a civil proceeding to hold the prosecutors liable when they negligently advance
a case.
Loperena Ruiz: There is a very famous expression in Mexico that all of us use.
After you are prosecuted and you are in prison, after a couple of years you are
acquitted. The government says, in Spanish, "Usted, dispense," or, "We are sorry."
So what is the liability of the government for these kinds of actions? Traditionally,
1. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)
2. See, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,18 U.S.C. § 831 (1994)
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the civil code set forth the liability of the state, and it said if that you cannot hold
personally liable the public officer who committed the illicit act, then the
government would also be liable from a civil point of view. But now there is a new
law about the civil liability of the state that is improving the way you can sue the
government for these kinds of actions.
But, what happens to the person who is prosecuted, who is accused in the media
or whatever you want, who spends time in high security prison? The government
says, "Oh, we're sorry, you were not the one, you were not guilty." What happened
with the life of this person? We have the same situation in the case of a very famous
homicide in Mexico, not because the dead person was a prominent politician but was
a well-known comedian. This case was litigated mainly on TV. The Attorney
General in Mexico City litigated the trial. It was a few years ago, June 7 of 1999,
I think. A famous comedian was killed in a very violent action, with machine guns
and so forth. Professional killers. Then his assistant, another comedian who was
on the stage, a girl, and some other people were prosecuted. The police found
somebody with a big moustache who had a criminal face, and people thought, of
course, he should be a murderer. After, maybe two years of trial and after two years
in prison, all of them were acquitted. Then, they appointed a new special prosecutor
for the case and nobody has been found guilty, and three or four or five people were
in jail all this time. The Commission of Human Rights in Mexico issued a
recommendation to the (now-former) Attorney General of Mexico City to withdraw
the charges against these people because there was not enough evidence. The
Attorney General refused to do so.
Now, I do not know if these people are planning to sue the government for having
been in prison for so long without any declaration of criminal liability.
Prof. Leo Romero: Let me just offer a couple of comments. First, sometimes the
press does abuse its freedoms. When they do, it is very difficult to hold them civilly
liable because of the protections that the press has been given by the United States
Supreme Court. However, another abuse to keep in mind occurs when prosecutors
leak information about an investigation to the press. Often good judges will try to
control that and to make sure that prosecutors are not trying their case in the press.
I also know many defense lawyers who find that the only way to combat that tactic
is to give the defense version to the press. Generally, when the prosecutor and the
defense try their cases in the press, the judge gets involved and decides enough is
enough and issues a gag order on both the prosecutor and defense counsel.
The other side of the coin, though, is that often the press that uncovers the white-
collar crime. Journalists sometimes dig deeper than official investigators and they
often uncover and find trails of evidence that they then bring to the attention of the
public, and, therefore, to the attention of the prosecutors, which may lead to criminal
prosecutions. So the press is one of those institutions that does some good things,
and, of course, it can also commit abuses.
Zagaris: You do increasingly see these civil rights or alien tort claims acts against
governments for sometimes improperly prosecuting people and for other civil rights
violations of detained persons. That gives an interesting spin to the civil-criminal
dichotomy.
Any other final thoughts or questions? Yes, John Rogers?
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John Rogers, Mexico City: I have a question regarding a particular type of white-
collar crime, fraud or embezzlement in a corporate context, and the approach taken
in Mexico versus the approach taken in the US. It seems to me that when a
company uncovers embezzlement or theft by employees or officers in Mexico, it is
not a simple matter of turning the case over to the prosecutor, or the ministerio
pablico. The company has to do a lot of the legwork to develop the case, which I
think would normally not be the case in the US. Lic. Loperena Ruiz, could you
explain why that is necessary, why the evidence has to be developed to a greater
degree by the complainant in Mexico before the case is presented to the prosecutor?
Loperena Ruiz: It is supposed that the ministerio ptiblico, or the prosecutor, is in
charge of the investigation of the crime, even without knowing whether a crime was
committed or not or if somebody is criminally liable. However, if the company is
interested in getting an indictment against the person who committed the criminal
offense against it, they have to look for more and more evidence. The ministerio
pablico will not be as interested in finding the guilty person and finding the proper
evidence because the punishment is a fine that affects only private interests. Up to
a given amount, they need an accusation filed by the damaged person to prosecute.
If the damaged person does not push the ministerio pablico, and continue to give
evidence to the ministerio pliblico, the ministerio paiblico will not be interested in
prosecuting the alleged crime. I think that the public prosecutor is more interested
in other kinds of crimes, like homicides, theft, or some other crimes. But, in white-
collar crime, the company has to provide the evidence because the company wants
the person who committed the crime to be punished.
Once, I had a case regarding a crime against a company. The attorney for the
company discovered that some employees were stealing merchandise, but before
they found there was a criminal action against them, they fired them. Once the
employees were out of the company, without any labor dispute, the company filed
criminal charges against the employees. The company prepared the accusation with
all the available evidence, but it was not enough. Although it was not enough, the
ministerio ptiblico started a criminal action before a judge, the judge issued the
arrest orders, and the accused were put in jail. After two and a half years, the former
employees were acquitted because the evidence was not enough. The company said,
"well, I am satisfied, because I put them in jail for two and a half years. I am happy
because they were punished, although they were officially innocent."
After that, the employees came to a civil lawyer and filed a complaint against the
company for a kind of false imprisonment or false arrest. I was given the case to
represent the defendant company in the civil action. The former employees claimed,
of course, all the damages for being deprived from their source of income and so
forth, and also they claimed for pain and suffering, what is called moral damage in
3. Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's office establishes that the mandate of the
rninis erio plblico is supervising and securing the observance of the constitutional legal order, trying to seek
prompt, expeditious and due justice, and overseeing within the limits of his or her powers that human rights are
respected. Organic Law of the Attorney General for the Republic (Ley Organica de la Procuraduria General de
Justicia de la Republica) Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Capitulo 1, December 27, 2002. Available through
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/txt/232.txt last visited March 21, 2003.
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Mexico. They were in two different courts. Although they had the same action
against the same company, they filed in different civil courts in Mexico City. One
of the courts acquitted my client because of the statute of limitations. The other said
that the statute of limitations had not passed, and then acquitted them because there
was not an immediate relation between the accusation before the prosecutor and the
imprisonment. The Mexican jurisprudence says the private person filing the
accusation is not liable because he or she does not have the power to imprison the
person harmed. That is the task of the public prosecutor and of the criminal judge.
Since, my client did not put those people in jail, but rather, the public prosecutor and
the judge did, my client was not liable and they were acquitted in the trial court as
well as in the court of appeals. They did not file the constitutional challenge that we
call amparo, so we had the two favorable judgments in two different courts for two
different reasons, although the defenses were exactly the same and the complaints
were exactly the same. My client was happy, and he said, "I do not know which of
the two courts was right and which of the two courts was wrong, but I am free of
any liability."
Zagaris: This panel discussion will continue with a presentation by Lic. Alejandro
Posadas on the anti-corruption efforts in Mexico followed by comments from the
panel and the audience.
Posadas: My discussion will cover anti-corruption issues in Mexico. First, I will
touch on the international aspects. Mexico is a party to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention4 and the Inter-
American Convention. 5 Mexico has amended its criminal code in connection with
bribery of foreign officials. It is not likely that there will be much action in Mexico
in this area simply because problems of domestic corruption will be dealt with
before prosecuting companies that bribe foreign officials. There is potential in
Mexico for this provision to be enforced at some point in the future because of the
network of trade agreements that Mexico has with many Central American and Latin
American countries and the European Union. There is important Mexican foreign
investment in Central America and many other countries. However, the accounting
standards of the OECD Convention are more important than the foreign bribery
provision.
Mexico did not make any amendments to its law to implement the accounting
standards and obligations. The Mexican fiscal code contains some very strict
accounting obligations. Article 1-11 criminalizes the making of off-book records,
etc. However, I think that we are not using the potential of the accounting
provisions for anticorruption purposes. They are strictly linked with fiscal auditing,
or the authority of officials to audit and review for tax evasion purposes. This
aspect can be potentially significant in Mexico.
4. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, opened for signature Dec.
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A,S. No. 4891
5. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 1.L.M. 724 (1996). For a detailed
analysis of the Convention, see L. Low, A. Bjorklund and K.C. Atkinson. "The Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption: A Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 38 Va. J. Int'l L 243 (1998)
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A corruption experience and perception index was developed this year by the
Tecnol6gico de Monterrey,6 which reported that 98 percent of companies polled said
they had bribed officials, and many of them were high government officials. So this
is a potential area for increased enforcement.
It is interesting that when we think about anticorruption efforts in Mexico, as we
heard the very good presentation by Lic. Labardini,7 we hear about the Controloria.
But in Mexico, the criminal enforcement relies on the ministerio paiblico under the
Attorney General's office. There are other institutions that also participate in these
efforts: the Fiscal Attorney General, the Mexican Banking Commission, etc. But
only the ministerio piiblico has the power in Mexico to press criminal charges and
initiate a criminal proceeding. We should question the role of the ministerioptiblico
because it has a very complex role in Mexican law, and is very effective when there
is political will to prosecute cases. It can conduct very complex investigations, but
generally, by itself, it is not an institution that was created to actively prosecute
criminal activities. Especially when it involves potential criminal activities of the
same government that is in power.
If we look again at one of these corruption and good government perception
indexes, we find in the one that was prepared by the Mexican chapter of
Transparency International 8 that people polled find that the most corrupt service,
after things relating to police tickets and things like that, is dealing with the
ministerio paiblico, and making it pursue a crime. A recurrent theme in Mexico is
insufficient evidence when you deal with the ministerio pidblico to prosecute an
offence. I think that is another challenge in Mexico, that we need to raise not only
of the powers of the ministerio ptiblico to press charges, but also increase its
evidentiary gathering powers, too.
This leads me back to whether we should have more institutions competing to
work on these problems, or if an independent anticorruption agency would be more
desirable. Corruption in Mexico has been traditionally linked with more than simply
economic benefit, usually for political advantages. One of the most important
corruption cases in Mexico right now is the Pemex scandal that is linked with
contributions to political parties. It is interesting to note an institution that was key
in the democratic process in Mexico, the Federal Electoral Institute, or Instituto
Federal Electoral,9 also gathered most of the evidence.
Two last points very quickly. What is going on currently in universities, in terms
of investigating corruption, is very important. Mexico requires a real diagnosis of
the problem, at least in terms of legal procedure. We always talk in Mexico about
reforming the laws, but we talk very little about the cases, their outcomes and how
they affect public policy and conduct. We do not know what the corruption cases
are about. We also need a real diagnosis of what is going on in the Attorney
General's office in terms of combating corruption. We must have to underscore the
relevance of the Freedom of Information Act that was just recently passed in Mexico
6. Business Perception of Government Corruption Index, see http://www.secodam.gob.mx/doctos/indices
indicetec.pdf, last visited March 29, 2003
7. See Lic. Labardini's articles in this volume
8. Mexican Chapter of International Transparency, Encuestra Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobiemo,
http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/transparencia.htm] last visited March 21, 2003.
9. See, <http://www.ife.org.ffx/>, last visited 4/8/03
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because, up until very recently, if you wanted to locate any judicial decision that had
to do with a particular aspect of a legal issue, it was almost impossible to do so
because they were not accessible to the public. There were no databases, etc. I
think this is something that has to be highlighted and we should watch how Mexican
society uses these new information rights.
Zagaris: Thank you very much. Those were excellent comments. Prof. Gordon?
Prof. Michael Gordon, Gainsville, Florida: I have a question about the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)'0 and all of the various Acts that have flowed out of
the OECD." There was not a lot of activity under the FCPA. We do not have very
many cases. Most cases are settled by consent decrees. Outside of the challenges
to the FCPA as it stood before it was amended to comply with the OECD
convention, have there been any cases that have dealt with those provisions which
amended the FCPA, and has there been any reporting of any activity in any of the
quite numerous countries that have adopted the convention? In other words, do we
have any experience beyond what we had with the original in the 1988 amendments
to the FCPA? Do we know about any cases filed under the post-1998 amendments?
Lucinda Low: Most cases are settled rather than litigated. To my knowledge, since
the 1998 amendments, the cases that have not been settled have included, first, the
ongoing litigation in the Federal District Court in Houston involving the two
terminated Baker Hughes executives who were involved in the Indonesian payment
scheme. They are alleging, among other things, that this was a case of extortion, so
it could be interesting. That case has not been decided. There was just a jury
verdict in the government's favor in the Costa Rican case against the coordinator of
the payment scheme there, a fellow named King. So that was litigated. In the
American Rice case the defendants prevailed at the district court stage, and that case
is currently under appeal. So that is the litigation that I am aware of since the 1998
amendments.
In the OECD arena, this year has marked the first cases under the OECD
Convention. Those are the Japanese case against Mitsui, the Canadian case
involving US Customs officials, and there is a third case in the works in Eastern
Europe, but charges have not been publicly filed yet. So that is what I am aware of
as far as enforcement activity. As far as I know, there have been no cases in Mexico
filed under Article 222-bis.
And my question is, apparently there is one other aspect of Article 222-bis,
Subsection 3, which is outside the scope of the OECD Convention, but it is a new
offense of trafficking in influence. This is something that the Counsel of Europe
Convention requires to be made a criminal offense, but it is not something we have
in the US. It is pretty interesting, so if we have any time left, I would like to hear
from our Mexican colleagues about that.
10. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 105-366 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988).
11. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, opened for signature Dec.
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S No. 4891
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Lic. Rodrigo Labardini: In my case, I do not know exactly, but according to the
article 222-bis, that would be forbidden. Unfortunately, since it is a very new
provision, I do not think we have enough experience to be able to properly define
its limits and contents. But just on its face and from reading article 222-bis, that
would be illegal.
Low: Just to clarify, from a US law standpoint, the rule is facilitating payments are
an exception to the bribery provisions, but not an exception to the books and records
provisions. We have to book them properly and that gets you to foreign law.
Remember, you will not find an exception for "facilitating payments," such as in the
statute. If you look at the statute, what you need to look for is the exception for
payments to secure routine governmental action. The idea behind this exception is
that if you are making a payment, and typically it is a fairly small payment although
the statute has no monetary threshold, in order to expedite some government action
which is not of a discretionary nature, which does not involve the award of a
business or the continuation of business, then you may do it. The statute gives some
examples. The classic case is the bureaucrat who has to stamp your papers and who
has got a stack of papers and yours is at the bottom of the pile, and if you slip him
a mordida, or bribe, he will move them to the top of the pile and it will be processed
within a week or a day instead of weeks or months. This is often very important for
Customs processing, especially if the cargo is perishable. That is one of the specific
exceptions, but there can be others. That is the concept.
Labardini: With that in mind, I would say that in accordance with Article 222-bis,
I believe that kind of facilitating payment would fall within the prohibited conducts
included in the definition of the crime of cohecho,"2 or bribery, because the public
official is not really applying him or herself to the task in hand, and would be doing
something "just or unjust" related to his/her official duties. In handling paperwork,
there is a natural order that should be followed, it is first-come, first-served basis.
Basically, we should do the paperwork as it is presented to us.
Low: The OECD Convention permits an exception for facilitating payments. A
few countries have included them in their implementing legislation. For instance,
Canada has. Mexico has not, as I understand it, nor is it an exception in Mexican
domestic bribery laws, in Article 222bis.
Bruce Zagaris, Esq. is a partner with the law firm of Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe,
Washington, D.C. 1101 Seventeenth St., NW, Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036.
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12. See tic. Labardini's other articles in this volume for a discussion of the concept of cohecho (bribery)
and that of dddiva (gift)
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